The Nature of Services and the Implications for Competition Policy by Karel, Annemieke
The Nature of Services and the Implications for
Competition Policy
Annemieke Karel∗
May 21, 2004
Abstract
Though ‘services’ is a very broad concept and any generalisations
should be made with caution, it is widely acknowledged that services
differ from goods in many respects. Analyses of key elements of market
structure, conduct and performance and the interface between these el-
ements show us that competition in services markets is equally distinc-
tive. We find that traditional competition policy instruments generally
do not reflect competition and performance in most services markets.
Alternative policy measures should recognise the importance and dis-
ciplining power of non-price competition and the fact that quality and
reputation are the main variables in services competition.
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The Nature of Services and the
Implications for Industrial Organisation
and Competition Policy
1 Introduction
Produced by “unproductive labour” , services were “[. . .] of course, not part
of the stock of wealth” in the minds of the great economic thinkers of the
eighteenth and nineteenth century.1 Two centuries later, services make up
approximately 64 percent of world GDP2 and rank high on the international
political agenda.
Despite the growing importance of services markets, there seems to be
little consensus on the definition of services. Still utilised today is the def-
inition of Fisher (1935) and Clark (1940), defining services as “the tertiary
sector”, which simply includes all forms of economic activity not included
in the primary or secondary section (i.e. agriculture or manufacturing).3
4 In a seminal paper, Hill (1977) defines a service as: “a change in the
condition of a person, or of a good belonging to some economic unit, which
is brought about as the result of the activity of some other economic unit,
with the prior agreement of the former person or economic unit”. He further
distinguishes services affecting goods, services affecting persons, and labour
services.5 Other services classifications can be found in Katouzian (1970)
and Sampson and Snape (1985). The former distinguishes ‘new services’
1Smith (1776); Marshall (1890).
2CIA Factbook (2003).
3See, for example, Productivity Commission (2002).
4Fisher (1935) specified that products of the tertiary sector consisted of “[. . .] facilities
for travel, amusements of various kinds, governmental and other personal and intangible
services, flowers, music, art, literature, education, science, philosophy and the like [. . .]”.
5Hill (1977) notes that capital services do not fit the definition developed in the paper
as they are not an autonomous economic unit and thus do not provide services as such.
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(almost coinciding with Fisher’s definition of tertiary products), ‘comple-
mentary services’ such as banking, finance, transportation, wholesale and
retail trade, and ‘old services’ (activities which flourished before industri-
alisation and have declined since, like domestic service). In an influential
paper, Sampson and Snape (1985) classify services based on how and where
the services are produced and traded, in particular they consider whether
the transactions occurred with or without movement of either or both the
producer and/or consumer.6
Essentially extending Hill’s (1977) definition of services, Miles and Bo-
den (2000) argue that the so-called tertiary sector can be seen as effecting
changes in the state of the environment, artefacts (produced by the manufac-
turing sector), people, and symbols (i.e. information). They list a number
of characteristics that are often seen as typical of services, the so-called
“peculiarities of services” (see Table I).
Though many of the activities we think of as services usually have several
of the characteristics listed in Table I in common, one can easily think of
exceptions; professional services, for example. The multinational accounting
and/or consultancy firm certainly has a very different ‘labour organisation
process’ than does the local craftsman, yet we label both as ‘services’. Con-
troversy exists also over the most frequently cited distinguishing feature of
services: their intangible or immaterial nature. If a dentist gives someone
false teeth or fillings - very material products - can we still consider this a
service? What about the consultant that provides his services by means of
a written report or cd-rom?
Hill (1997) states that “the habit of describing services as intangible
products is an invention of economists” and adds that “services have noth-
6The work of Sampson and Snape (1985) is likely to have served as a basis for Article
I of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which sets out a comprehensive
definition of trade in services in terms of four different modes of supply: cross-border,
consumption abroad, commercial presence in the consuming country, and presence of
natural persons.
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Table I: Services characteristics
Service production 
Techonology and plant  Low levels of capital equipment; heavy investment in buildings.  
Labour Some services highly professional (especially requiring 
interpersonal skills); others relatively unskilled, often involving 
casual or part-time labour. Specialist knowledge may be important 
but rarely technological skills. 
Organisation of labour Workforce often engaged in craft-like production with limited 
Process management control of details of work 
Features of production Production is often noncontinuous and economies of scale are 
limited. 
Organisation of industry Some services state-run public services; others often small-scale 
with high preponderance of family firms and self-employed. 
 
Service product 
Nature of product Immaterial, often information-intensive. Hard to store or transport. 
Process and product hard to distinguish. 
Features of product  Often customised to consumer requirements. 
Intellectual property Hard to protect (can rarely be patented, though copyright or design 
rights may be possible), easy to copy many service innovations. 
Reputation is often crucial. 
 
Service consumption 
Delivery of product Production and consumption coterminous in time and space; often 
client or supplier has to move to meet the other party. 
Role of consumer Services are consumer intensive, requiring inputs from consumer 
into design/production process. 
Organisation of consumption Often hard to separate production from consumption. Self-service 
in formal and informal economies commonplace.  
 
Service markets 
Organisation of markets Some services delivered via public sector bureaucratic provision. 
Some costs are invisibly bundled with goods (e.g. retail sector).  
Regulation Professional regulation common in some services. 
Marketing Difficult to demonstrate products in advance. 
 
Source: Miles and Boden (2000).
ing in common with intangibles, despite the practice of describing them as
such”. He emphasises two essential characteristics of services, namely that
services cannot be produced without the agreement, co-operation and pos-
sible active participation of the consuming unit(s), and that the outputs
produced are not separate entities that exist independently of the produc-
ers or consumers. He clearly distinguishes services from both tangible and
intangible goods. Goods are entities that exist independently of their owner
and preserve their identity through time. If ownership rights can be estab-
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lished it follows that they can also be transferred from one economic unit
to another, which implies that goods must be exchangeable. The owner
of a good derives some economic benefit from owning it, in contrast to a
‘bad’, which has a negative exchange value. Intangible goods are described
as intangible entities which have all the economic characteristics of goods,
that are originally produced as outputs by persons, or enterprises, engaged
in creative or innovative activities of a literary, scientific, engineering, artis-
tic, or entertainment nature. In contrast, services are not separate entities
that exist independently of the direct interaction between producers and
consumers. They can therefore not be stocked and ownership cannot be
transferred. In addition, quantification of services is much less informative
than it is in the case of other commodities. Not only are services difficult to
measure, it appears that quality is the more relevant variable, not quantity.
Hill’s notion of services appears to be the most accurate one presented in
the services literature to date and will therefore act as a reference point for
the remaining part of this paper.7
Though there has clearly been much thought on services and their in-
creasing role in today’s economies, an important issue that is not only miss-
ing in Table I, but in the services literature in general, is services competi-
tion. If we accept that services are different from goods and even intangible
goods, that their production and consumption is different, and that their
markets are different, it seems only natural to think that competition within
these markets is different as well. If this is the case, there are important
implications for competition policy in services markets. It is the purpose
of this paper to examine the nature of services competition and to deter-
mine whether this justifies an adaptation of current competition policy mea-
7As becomes clear from Table I, “services” are a wide concept, encompassing a broad
range of activities that have a number of common features, but may at the same time
differ in market-specific characteristics. It should be noted that the structure, conduct,
and performance analyses that follow include parts that do not necessarily apply to all
services markets. Where this is the case, it will be clearly indicated.
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sures. Section 2 looks at the characteristics of the prevailing market struc-
tures in most services industries, particulary asymmetric information and
the existence of barriers to entry. Section 3 analyses the kind of non-price
competition present in services markets and the associated firm behaviour.
Section 4 combines economic theory and empirical evidence to picture the
performance in services markets, focussing on product diversity, advertising,
market power, and collusion. Section 5 evaluates current performance mea-
sures and other competition policy instruments and their appropriateness in
providing a framework for efficient competition in services markets. Finally,
Section 6 sums up the main findings and concludes on the nature of services
competition and the implications for competition policy.
2 Market Structure
2.1 Monopolistic competition and oligopoly
The market structures observed in most services industries are best de-
scribed as either monopolistic competition or oligopoly. The basic features
of these market structures are listed in Table II. The most obvious structural
Table II: Market structure features
Monopolistic competition Oligopoly
many small buyers many small buyers
many small sellers few large sellers
heterogeneous products hetero-/homogeneous products
buyers may (not) be informed buyers may (not) be informed
free entry entry factors
feature of services markets is the fact that the ‘products’ are heterogeneous.
The very nature of services production implies that no two services are ex-
actly the same, as service provision at any time is determined by the provider
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and consumer at that particular point in time.
Second, most services markets are characterised by many small buyers,
in the sense that no one of them can individually influence the market price.
Where there are many sellers, the service market in question is described
as monopolistic competition. Monopolistically competitive services markets
are for example markets for hairdressing, carwashes, travel bookings, etc.
These markets are characterised by a large number of providers, no one
of which is large relative to the overall market, and all of which try to
differentiate their service from those offered by other providers. Where there
are increasing returns to scale, network effects, high sunk cost, or (other)
determinants of entry, a few large providers may serve the market instead,
in which case we speak of an oligopoly. Section 2.3 will elaborate on possible
barriers to entry that may cause an oligopolistic market structure in various
services markets.
A final characterising feature of both monopolistic competition and oligo-
poly is the possible presence of asymmetric information. This is a particular
issue in services industries. Service suppliers, for example, typically have
more information about the quality of the service provided than most cus-
tomers. In some cases, customers cannot even evaluate the quality of the
service after purchase/consumption.8 They can therefore not accurately as-
sess the price/quality relation offered by any service supplier, which allows
the latter to price above marginal cost. So-called “moral hazard” problems
like this are often present in services markets. In addition, high-quality ser-
vices may be driven out of the market due to “adverse selection”. Section
2.2 analyses these issues of asymmetric information in services markets.
8The term used in the economic literature for these type of products is ‘credence goods’.
Consumers are usually unable to observe the quality of the credence good (service) they
received, or, if this quality is observable ex post, they cannot - or only with a time lag -
judge whether it is the ex ante needed one (think of medical services, for example).
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2.2 Asymmetric information
2.2.1 Moral hazard
Moral hazard can be defined as opportunism characterised by an informed
person’s taking advantage of a less-informed person through an unobserved
action.9 Moral hazard problems are particularly present in services markets,
as these markets are per definition characterised by asymmetric information.
The customer-provider relation can be characterised by moral hazard in both
ways. First, moral hazard occurs due to the customer’s inability to observe
actions taken by the service provider (i.e. the provider’s actions are hid-
den).10 In other words, because customers cannot observe the quality of the
service provided, service providers are tempted to under-perform/overcharge
unless they face an incentive to provide proper services.
Standard principal-agent theory tells us moral hazard problems like this
can at least partly be overcome by designing contracts that limit the in-
formed party’s opportunistic behaviour. As the customers cannot directly
observe the variable they would want to observe (i.e., the exact quality of
the service), any payment for the provision of the service is necessarily based
on correlated, observable variables like the outcome or the time spent on the
service provision. For example, instead of the quality of the service t, the
principal (customer) observes a signal x = µ(t) + ε.11 Because he cannot
tie the contract to t, the principal makes it conditional on x. In a simple
linear example, the agent’s (service provider’s) wage would be of the form
w = αx + β. Assuming the agent will maximise his own expected utility
given the contract and will actually prefer the contract to an outside op-
tion,12 the principal can maximise his expected utility with respect to α,
thereby optimising x, the signal of the true (but unobservable) quality of
9Perloff (2001).
10See Holmstrom (1985).
11See Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991).
12In the principal-agent literature, these conditions are respectively called the ‘incentive
compatibility constraint’ and the ‘individual rationality constraint’.
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the service t.
Sometimes, however, it can be preferable for principals not to specify
certain quality signals in contracts with agents as such specifications may
divert focus away from the real quality of the service to the observable
feature only. Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) argue that where multiple
performance aspects are important to the principal, it is better to pay a
fixed wage instead of conditioning the wage on the measurable aspect only.
Assuming there is one unmeasurable and one measurable attribute to the
provision of the service, µ(t1, t2) is reduced to µ(t2) in x = µ(t)+ ε. A wage
structure like w = αx + β would then result in an optimal effort x, based
only on (t2). Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) use the example of a home
renovation, where some desirable attributes of the contractor’s performance
such as courtesy, attention to detail, or helpful advice, are unmeasurable.
The contractor would focus on the measurable attribute, timely completion,
at the cost of the unmeasurable attributes if his wage was tied to measurable
performance aspects only. A fixed wage would not provide him with this
incentive and would more likely result in an even distribution of effort and
thus a more desirable outcome for the principal. The same analysis applies
to other services.13
Moral hazard problems can also present themselves in the other direc-
tion - especially in financial markets, it is the actions of the customer that
are hidden. The less-informed service provider cannot control or even ob-
serve the behaviour of customers, which allows those customers to behave
more opportunistically than they would under full information. The classic
example is the insurance market. Without insurance, homeowners, for ex-
ample, have ample incentives to protect their homes from burglary, fire, etc.
13Exceptions are for example legal services, that are often based on contingent contracts
- contracts that are contingent upon variables that are both relevant to the delivery of the
service and are observed so that contracts can be enforced. Lawyers often sell their legal
services on an outcome contingent basis: if they win their case they collect a share of the
award, if they lose they may charge nothing. See Holmstro¨m (1985), p188.
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and thus to provide locks, fire alarms, etc. Insurance, however, changes the
marginal benefit of such precautions as the insurance company will cover the
costs of replacing/repairing the house in case anything happens, whether the
precautionary measures are in place or not.14 Also, as the insurance com-
pany cannot observe the amount of precautions taken, it cannot base its
premium on that and consequently cannot give financial incentives to cus-
tomers that induce them to increase the amount of precautions they take
(i.e., reduce the risk for the insurance company). In other words, the private
benefit of ’correct’ behaviour becomes smaller than the social benefit under
asymmetric information.
Similarly, banks are subject to moral hazard when holding deposits and
providing financial credit, as investment is usually made subsequent to fi-
nancing. As banks have only limited control over the actual use and re-
payment of the funds, debtors have low incentives to act in society’s best
interest to the extent that this behaviour does not coincide with their private
interest after the financing has taken place.15 16
2.2.2 Adverse selection
Another asymmetric informational problem that might arise in services mar-
kets is ‘adverse selection’. ‘Adverse selection’ is the term used in economic
literature to describe the process in which asymmetric information lowers
the quality of goods or services supplied in the market.17 Service suppliers
14This is a simplified example to illustrate the principle of moral hazard. In reality we
often observe clauses in insurance contracts that prescribe a certain level of care to reduce
the risk to the insurance company.
15Of course this argument assumes a static setting. In a more dynamic setting, firms
borrowing from the financial market will take future borrowing possibilities into account
and will value a good reputation as a debtor.
16This analysis applies not only to firms and individuals, but also to countries (think of
countries borrowing from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund).
17Resulting from Akerlof’s (1970) classic analysis of the market for lemons (low-quality
cars).
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typically have more information about the quality of the service provided
than most customers have.18 The uninformed buyer has an equal chance of
purchasing a low or a high-quality service and will determine his willingness
to pay based on the expected value of the service (the sum of his reservation
prices times the probabilities of actually purchasing the associated levels of
quality). If the high-quality service providers’ reservation price lies below
the buyers’ expected value, equilibrium in the market is determined by the
intersection of supply and demand at a price equal to the buyers’ expected
value.19 However, if the service providers’ reservation price exceeds the buy-
ers’ expected value, the former will be unwilling to sell the service and as
a result, the low-quality services will drive the high-quality services out of
the market. For example, car maintenance services are difficult to evaluate
for customers so they base their reservation price on the expected value of
the service they will receive. If the high-quality providers’ reservation price
exceeds this expected value, they will find it no longer profitable to stay
in business and leave the market. The only suppliers left are low-quality
service providers and when consumers realise that at any price below the
high-quality providers’ reservation price, they will only be able to receive
low-quality maintenance on their cars, equilibrium in the low-quality mar-
ket segment (the only market segment left) is simply determined by the
supply of and demand for low-quality repair services.20
18At the very least, customers have less information prior to the consumption of the
service, but in many cases (think of experts’ services like medical or legal services, the
so-called “credence goods”) customers often cannot determine the extent of the service
that was needed and how much was actually performed. See Wolinsky (1993).
19Although this outcome is efficient, the allocation of funds differs because low-quality
providers receive more than they would under full information, at the expense of high-
quality providers who would benefit from buyers’ higher reservation price for high-quality
goods if they could only distinguish between services of different quality (i.e., in a full
information situation).
20In practice, this means that certain people will choose to (attempt to) repair their
cars themselves or to keep driving without any maintenance at all (neither option seems
socially desirable!).
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Carlton and Perloff (2000) rightfully remark that not all markets with
asymmetric information degenerate so that only the lowest-quality item is
sold. However, markets characterised by asymmetric information are likely
to be inefficient compared to markets with full information, in that quality
levels maybe lower.21 The cause of this inefficiency is in essence an exter-
nality problem. By raising the quality of his service, an individual service
provider raises the average quality in the market and thereby consumers’ ex-
pected value of all products, as they cannot distinguish between the higher-
quality service and the other services offered in the market. Though the
individual service provider bears all the cost of the quality increase, he has
to share the benefits with all the other providers in the market because the
quality increase allows everyone to charge a higher price (which equals the
increased expected value of the consumers). Clearly, there is no incentive
for individual service providers to produce and sell higher-quality services
in markets with asymmetric information.
There are a number of ways to overcome this externality, however.22
Guarantees or warranties allow sellers to credibly to credibly convey the in-
formation to consumers that their products are in fact of high quality. Due
to the perceptive element in services consumption, however, these measures
may be less suited for services quality signaling. Service providers are more
likely to rely on reputation. In fact, reputation and goodwill are crucial
assets in most services markets, as they provide a strong signal with respect
to the quality of the services provided. Another important quality signal-
ing tool are standards and certifications - in services markets, particularly
in markets for expert services, this usually comes in the form of proof of a
particular education. Alternatively, membership of an industry organisation
can be used as a certificate signaling a certain quality threshold. Though
21It should be noted that in the case of services markets, comparisons with situations
of full information may not be appropriate because asymmetric information is inherent in
service provision.
22See, for example, Carlton and Perloff (2000) and Holmstro¨m (1985).
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these measures may not always fully eliminate all the information asymme-
tries, it should be noted that these asymmetries are inherent to the nature
of services, irrespective of who provides them or to what extent they are
regulated.
2.3 Entry factors
Entry factors are a structural market feature of oligopoly, but not of monopo-
listic competition. The relevant factors in services industries stem from sunk
costs, network effects, and collusion. However, the extent to which these fac-
tors translate into barriers to entry in services markets is not always entirely
clear, not in the least because opposing views exist on what exactly consti-
tutes a barrier to entry. In the tradition of Bain (1968), barriers to entry
are defined as the extent to which, in the long run, established firms can
elevate their selling prices above the minimal average costs of production
and distribution without inducing potential entrants to enter the industry.
He distinguishes three main sources of barriers to entry/advantages of es-
tablished over potential entrant firms: product differentiation, absolute cost
advantages, and economies of scale. Stigler (1968b), on the other hand, ar-
gues that a barrier to entry is merely “[. . .] a cost of producing (at some or
every rate of output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an
industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry”. Hence, accord-
ing to Stigler’s definition, setup costs, advertising outlays and economies of
scale are not barriers to entry, so long as the incumbent firms face(d) the
same costs as the entrants do.23
Baumol and Willig (1981) use essentially the same definition as Stigler
(1968b) and conclude that fixed costs do not constitute barriers to entry,
but sunk costs can. Specifically, they state that “[. . .] their role as barriers
to entry depends on the risk to which they subject the entrant”, implying
23Stigler (1968b) recognises that product differentiation only acts as a barrier to entry
“[. . .] if the costs of differentiation (design, advertising, etc.) are higher for a new firm
than an existing firm”.
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that the prospective of incurring large sunk costs (and thus large potential
losses in case of market exit) may make firms reluctant to enter a market in
which they are uncertain of success.24 Sunk costs may also act as a barrier
to entry if the extent to which costs are sunk determines the cost of capital
- potential entrants may face higher rental cost as capital markets work
imperfectly and providers demand a risk premium on top of the ‘normal’
cost of capital.25 Sutton (1991) does not appear to dispute the argument
that sunk setup costs may act as an exogenous barrier to entry, but does
oppose the view that sunk advertising outlays merely shift this barrier, as
long as such outlays can induce some fixed fraction of consumers to choose
some particular firm’s offerings at a price level that exceeds that firm’s unit
variable cost. This theory is known as the natural oligopoly theory.26
Sunk setup and advertising costs are present in most, if not all, ser-
vices markets. Following Stigler (1968) and Baumol and Willig (1981), we
conclude that these costs constitute a factor but not generally a barrier to
entry.
Another entry factor in some service industries is the presence of positive
network externalities. This basically means that the value of the network
increases with the number of users. The larger (and thus more valuable) the
network, the larger the so-called ’switching costs’ for users, i.e., the more
difficult/expensive it is for them to switch to a competing supplier. The
entry factors created by these switching cost present themselves in services
markets like telecommunications, software and transport services.
Finally, entry can be determined by collusion among service providers.
Though some doubt the possibility of collusion in markets characterised by
intense non-price competition (see section 4.3), a number of services mar-
kets, particularly markets for professional services, are to a greater or lesser
24Perloff (2001), p285.
25Unlike the incumbents, entrants do not have records of the success rate of past sales
efforts or a captive clientele that may reduce the risk premium.
26See section 3.1.
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extent regulated by professional associations. The main rationale for the
existence of these associations is to ensure the quality of the services pro-
vided to overcome the informational asymmetries that exist between pro-
fessionals and clients. They often do this by maintaining qualitative entry
restrictions.27 It should be noted, however, that the entry-restricting powers
of these organisations seem to be weakening due to increasing government
intervention in services markets to stimulate competition.28 Moreover, Fer-
shtman and Pakes (1999) argue that, in comparing a heterogeneous market
equilibrium with and without collusive possibility, the collusive industry is
not only less concentrated and offers both more and higher quality products
to consumers, but also that that positive effect of collusion on the variety
and quality of products marketed more than compensates consumers for the
negative effect of collusive prices, so that consumer surplus is larger in the
collusive environment. In other words, to the extent that collusion is feasible
in services markets, it does not necessarily imply a decrease in welfare.
3 Market Conduct
3.1 Non-price competition
Non-price competition is an essential feature of services markets, whether
they can be characterised as monopolistic competition or as oligopolistic, as
reputation is often the crucial asset of a service provider. Non-price efforts
are believed to generate demand, especially where the ’product’ cannot be
evaluated before consumption (as is the case in services industries). Though
advertising is a main form of non-price competition, the term should be
interpreted as encompassing all forms of non-price competition.
In modern economic literature, two distinctions are made regarding prod-
uct differentiation. Where consumers show differences in subjective tastes,
27See also section 5.4.
28Noether (1986):“Both popular and professional writings suggest that the American
Medical Association (AMA) no longer wields the authority that it held even 10 years ago”.
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we find producers engaging in horizontal product differentiation. Hotelling
(1929) developed the first horizontal differentiation model, which is still the
most-referenced model today. According to the Hotelling model, in the sim-
ple case of uniform pricing, all consumers are distributed uniformly along a
straight line and sellers are located at different points along this line. In this
model, it is assumed that customers have no preference for either seller ex-
cept on the ground of price plus the cost of transporting the goods from the
seller’s location to their own location. Salanie´ (2000) rightfully remarks that
the product could generally present itself in numerous varieties other than
location, the obvious example being quality. This makes Hotelling’s (1929)
model very suited to analyse markets in which firms are selling products
or services of different qualities to a population of consumers differing in
their taste for quality.29 Where consumers recognise that different services
are actually different qualities of the same service, however, quality becomes
an attribute of vertical product differentiation. Shaked and Sutton (1987)
define vertical differentiation as follows: “given any two distinct products, if
they were sold at the same price, then all consumers would choose the same
one (the ‘higher quality’ product)”. In other words, consumers are willing
to pay different prices for (what they perceive to be) different quality levels.
In practice, services can be differentiated both horizontally and verti-
cally, as consumers differ in income, tastes, or both.30 The endogenous sunk
cost (ESC) model developed by Sutton (1991) analyses market situations
that are characterised by horizontal and vertical differentiation.31 It basi-
cally concludes that the classical negative relationship between market size
and concentration is not necessarily valid for industries in which advertising
or other sunk outlays play a significant role. This conclusion is based on
the notion that when sunk outlays enhance consumers’ willingness-to-pay,
29In the original analysis of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) this difference rests on dif-
ferences in income.
30Shaked and Sutton (1987).
31See Appendix A for a more detailed presentation of the model.
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thereby increasing the size of the market, competition will lead to escalat-
ing investment in sunk costs by the dominant firms in the market, thereby
preventing the industry from converging to a fragmented structure. These
key findings hold in an extended version of the model that allows for dif-
ferences in consumer tastes. Dick (2002) and Ellickson (2003) respectively
show that the ESC model applies to banking services and retail industries
(supermarkets) and that measures of quality other than advertising lead to
similar outcomes - as long as they are increased primarily through sunk in-
vestments. Further empirical research should be able to tell whether the
ESC model applies to services markets in general, but given that it allows
for both horizontal and vertical differentiation - the main features of com-
petition in services - this is likely to be the case. The implications of these
findings will be analysed in sections 4 and 5.
3.2 Quality discrimination
As long as service providers know more about the quality of their services
than their customers do, they have at least some market power. In most
services industries this is reinforced by consumer loyalty and search costs.
We have seen that asymmetric information may create difficulties for con-
sumers in distinguishing between services of different qualities. Similarly,
it may cause different consumers to have different beliefs about services
of equal quality. Where this is the case, service providers, having market
power, can successfully engage in second degree price discrimination. When
the same price schedule is offered to all consumers, they sort themselves
through a process of self-selection - consumers who (perhaps falsely) believe
some services are of higher quality than other, similar services, pay more.
Perloff (2001) notes that price discrimination is only possible if some, not
all, consumers face asymmetric information, i.e. where some consumers are
informed and some are not. If all consumers would be informed or all would
be uninformed about the quality of various services, service providers would
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be best off charging a single price.
Second-degree price discrimination appears to be particularly suitable in
credence goods/services markets. In the case of expert services provided by,
for example, medical doctors, lawyers or mechanics, consumers are usually
unable to observe the quality of the service they received, or, if this quality
is observable ex post, they cannot judge whether it is the ex ante needed
one. Credence goods literature has mostly focused on two major inefficiency
sources: inefficient treatment and overcharging.32 Figure 1 is a simple game-
tree taken from Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2003) which illustrates these
concepts. First, the expert posts his prices (p1, p2). The consumer observes
these prices and decides whether to visit the expert or not (in, out). Next,
nature determines the severity of the consumer’s problem/service demand
(k = 1, 2). The expert provides either high- or low-quality service (ck = c1,
c2), and finally charges for either high- or low-quality service (c1, c2).
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2003) argue that if the assumption of homoge-
nous consumers is relaxed (to allow for the possibility of second-degree price
discrimination), three classes of tariffs or price schedules can be distinguished
in the basic model represented in Figure 1. One type of tariff contains a
higher mark-up for the expensive treatment (p2− c2 > p1− c1), other tariffs
have a higher mark-up for the cheap treatment (p2 − c2 < p1 − c1), and a
third group of tariffs has equal mark-ups (p2−c2 = p1−c1). The authors find
that only under tariffs where the differences in the intervention prices reflect
the differences in treatment costs (equal mark-up tariffs) will the expert per-
form a serious diagnosis and recommend the appropriate treatment. Under
tariffs where the intervention prices depart from the equal mark-up rule the
expert will recommend and provide the most profitable treatment without
32There are two types of inefficient treatment. Undertreatment means a simple pro-
cedure is provided while a high quality intervention is required and overtreatment is the
provision of high-quality service where a simple one would have sufficed. Overcharging
means a high-quality price is charged while a low-quality service is provided. See Dulleck
and Kerschbamer (2003).
19
Figure 1: Credence goods
Expert posts prices
Consumer decides whether to
visit the expert or not
Nature determines severity of
problem
Expert provides service
Expert charges
        C1                        C2               C1                         C2                 C1                        C2                C1                       C2
    out                                      in
      p1, p2
      1                                                                    2
     C1                                  C2                                                        C1                                 C2
 overprovision underprovision
overcharging
a serious diagnosis. In other words, high quality diagnosis and appropriate
treatment is sold to the most profitable market segment only.
Masson and Wu (1974) argue there is ample evidence of price discrimina-
tion in the market for physicians’ services, even after accounting for charity
pricing for low-income groups and the possible collusive power of the type of
industry organisations that are common in most medical professions.33 They
take a somewhat different approach than Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2003)
and argue that price discrimination for physicians’ services is enabled by
different information/search costs and concerns about quality for rich and
poor consumers. They assume the opportunity cost of search is higher for
the rich than for the poor, and that the rich tend to search less because
their medical expenditures constitute a smaller proportion of their income
(i.e., the elasticity of demand for physicians’ services is different among in-
come groups: the higher the income, the lower the elasticity at every price
level).34 In addition, it is thought that if quality of treatment (service) is a
33For example, the American Medical Association (AMA).
34See Masson and Wu (1974), p67.
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normal good, the rich may concentrate on finding a higher quality doctor.
Though in principle quality discrimination is possible in any service mar-
ket (as long as the service provider has some degree of market power), empir-
ical evidence shows it is mostly found in markets for credence goods/services.
Many professional services, and medical services in particular, seem to be
subject to second-degree price discrimination.
3.3 Strategic firm behaviour
In oligopolistic services markets in particular, non-price tools, such as adver-
tising and product quality, provide the major source of interfirm rivalry.35 In
many studies of oligopolistic competition, the standard Cournot assumption
is adopted: firms suppose that their decisions will have no impact on their
rivals’ future actions.36 In other words, it is often assumed that the con-
jectural variation is 0. The conjectural variation measures the elasticity of
rivals’ advertising (or output, or price) with respect to firm i ’s advertising,
i.e. it is the percentage change in all other firms’ advertising outlays (z−i)
that firm i expects in response to a 1 percent change in its own advertising
outlay (zi):
37
αi =
∆z−i/z−i
∆zi/zi
=
zi
z−i
∆z−i
∆zi
. (1)
Scherer (1980) feels that an advertising conjectural variation of zero (the
standard Cournot assumption) may be plausible for two reasons. First, it
takes some time for rivals to respond to the firm’s changes in advertising
messages, so the firm may behave as if the rivals will not respond. Second,
rivals actually may be unresponsive to changes in the firm’s advertising,
especially in the face of increased advertising on the part of the firm, because
of the uncertainties of the effect of the firm’s campaign. Unfortunately
35Roberts and Samuelson (1988).
36In the classic Cournot model, it is assumed that each firm believes that its rivals hold
output constant. To many authors, this assumption appears implausible (see, for example,
Martin (1994), p123).
37Martin (1994), p127.
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little is known about possible conjectural variations in services markets.
We can, however, infer some cautious results from the extensively studied
US cigarette market, which, like many services markets, is an advertising-
intensive market.
Roberts and Samuelson (1988) find the conjectural variations to be neg-
ative in the US cigarette market. In other words, in response to an increase
in advertising by one supplier, all other suppliers would decrease their adver-
tising. This result is surprising, and is unlikely to apply to services markets,
where reputation is crucial for firms’ survival and where any increase in non-
price efforts is likely to be met by rivals. In other words, if anything, we
would expect a positive conjectural variation in advertising-intensive mar-
kets. This expectation is met by Seldon, Banerjee and Boyd (1993), who call
Roberts and Samuelson’s (1988) finding “[. . .] startling on two counts”. Not
only is a negative conjectural variation in an industry where product dif-
ferentiation is important intuitively surprising, it also contradicts empirical
evidence. They critique the estimation method used by Roberts and Samuel-
son (1988) and find positive advertising conjectural variations instead.
In the terminology of Tirole (1988) this means that advertising messages
(and other non-price efforts) are strategic complements. That is, it is in a
firm’s best interest to, following an increase in advertising outlays by its
rival(s), increase its advertising outlays accordingly. Intuitively, this is what
we would expect to be the case in most services markets. Our intuition is
confirmed by Atle Berg and Kim (1994), who find positive conjectural vari-
ations in the Norwegian banking sector. However, at this moment, sufficient
empirical research to be fully conclusive on this matter is lacking.
4 Market Performance
Ultimately, the decisions in antitrust cases are taken based on market per-
formance. The question is not whether the market is concentrated, but
whether this concentration predisposes multi or unilateral market power.
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For merger evaluation it is the potentiality that matters. We assume the
ultimate focus of competition authorities is the efficiency of markets and the
extent to which the outcome of the competitive process is socially optimal.
However, market structure and performance are the outcome of the work-
ings of competition and market conduct and can therefore not be analysed
separately. The following section thus serves two purposes: to conclude our
discussion on the nature of services competition and to lay the foundations
for our analysis on the implications for competition policy in the subsequent
section.
4.1 Product diversity
Many studies on product differentiation have concerned themselves with the
question of optimal product diversity. As Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) remark,
“modeling the desirability of variety has been thought to be difficult and
several [. . .] approaches have been adopted”. Gabszwicz and Thisse (1986),
for example, base their ideas on the Hotelling (1929) spatial approach and
compare performance under horizontal and vertical product differentiation.
They find that in the case of horizontal differentiation, there exists no perfect
equilibrium, as no price equilibrium can exist if any two sellers are located
sufficiently close to each other.38 The result is that horizontal product differ-
entiation entails unstable price and product competition. The model used by
Gabszwicz and Thisse (1986) suggests more stability is to be expected under
vertical product differentiation, though the authors note that it is unknown
whether this conclusion stands up in a more general setting. Modifications
of the model generate the same result, however. Salop (1979) analyses a vari-
ant of the traditional Hotelling (1929) model in which the economy consists
of two industries, rather than one.39 In this general equilibrium setting, it is
38Here, too, ‘location’ should be interpreted to encompass a wide range of quality fea-
tures.
39One industry is monopolistically competitive with differentiated brands and decreasng
average costs; the other is a competitive industry producing a homogeneous commodity.
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found that the optimum variety depends on the difference between the aver-
age surplus and the surplus of the marginal consumer, relative to fixed costs;
“the value of adding an extra brand (and respacing the others) effectively
converts marginal consumers to average ones, at fixed cost”.40
Other studies of optimal product differentiation are based on Lancaster’s
(1975) “characteristics” approach. In this “indirect analysis of consumer be-
haviour”, the consumer is assumed to derive his actual utility or satisfaction
from characteristics which cannot in general be purchased directly, but are
incorporated in goods.41 Lancaster concludes that a socially optimal degree
of product differentiation does exist, but that its conditions are difficult to
recognise with respect to the actual number of varieties. More importantly,
however, is the finding that in the case of constant returns to scale, market
imperfections do not tend to give a non-optimal degree of product differenti-
ation, whereas they do under increasing returns to scale. Specifically, under
constant returns to scale, the optimal number of product varieties is not fi-
nite unless consumer preferences are - where preferences form a continuum,
optimal product differentiation is essentially unbounded. Under increasing
returns to scale, however, the optimal degree of product differentiation is
bounded and can, in principle, be determined. This is the reason why most
studies of optimal product diversity are confined to the case of increasing
returns to scale.42
In services industries, however, economies of scale are limited (see Ta-
ble I) as input and output are often the same. This implies that, given
See Salop (1979), p142.
40Salop (1979), p152.
41Lancaster (1975), p567.
42See, for example, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), who use a direct approach, noting that
the convexity of indifference surfaces of conventional utility functions already embodies
the desirability of variety. Assuming economies of scale, they compare the market equi-
librium with the constrained (by the assumption that each firm must have non-negative
profits) and the unconstrained optimum under constant and variable intra- and intersector
elasticities of substitution.
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that preferences are continuous, product differentiation in monopolistically
competitive or even oligopolistic services markets is, contrary to economic
intuition,43 not necessarily non-optimal.
4.2 Advertising
The advertising literature is characterised by debates tha tinclude advertis-
ing effects on price-elasticity, competition, and transparency. The optimal
amount of advertising in static as well as dynamic settings is also unresolved.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to review all these issues here. Instead,
we will touch upon a few issues that are particularly relevant for the analysis
of performance in services markets.
Advertising is generally thought to be excessive. Spence (1977), for
example, compares the market equilibrium with the social optimum under
monopolistic competition, and finds that, in case of constant elasticity of de-
mand, markets tend to oversupply non-price services such as advertising (see
Appendix B). Netter (1982) finds empirical evidence that in some markets,
competitive advertising may be mutually destructive and thus non-optimal
from a welfare point of view.
In a seminal paper, Dorfman and Steiner (1954) determine the optimal
amount of advertising for differentiated markets. Equilibrium is found when
the slope of the demand curve (i.e. the price-sensitivity of demand) is equal
to the rate at which sales increase in response to increases in average cost
incurred in order to increase quality. In this model, quality tends to be
higher “the greater the sensitivity of consumers to quality variation [. . . ],
the lower the sensitivity of consumers to price variation [. . . ], and the lower
the effect on average costs of quality changes”. Criticism of these results
is perhaps best presented in Becker and Murphy (1993), which disputes
the assumption adopted in the Dorfman-Steiner theorem that the effect of
43As Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) put it: “The fact that in a Chamberlinian equilibrium
each firm operates to the left of the point of minimum average cost has been conventionally
described by saying that there is excess capacity.”
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advertising on the quantity demanded is independent of (instead of positively
related to) the price-elasticity of demand. In other words, what counts is the
effect of advertising on the utility from marginal units of product x. Becker
and Murphy (1993) determine whether advertising is socially optimal by
means of the ‘surplus criterion’:
dS
dA
R 0 as Va − x
dpx
dA
−
dT
dA
R 0, (2)
where S is total surplus, x the product advertised, px the price of x and T
any revenue from the sale of advertising A. The term Va is the marginal
utility to consumers from advertisements for x (net of any reduction induced
by these advertisements in the utility from other goods).44
An extensive body of literature also exists on the dynamic effects of
advertising and how this effects the social optimum. Most of this work is
based on a seminal paper by Arrow and Nerlove (1962), which argues that
advertising expenditure should be treated in the same way as investment
in a durable good. The authors assume current demand is determined by
a stock of goodwill, which summarises past advertising and, like capital
stock, depreciates over time. They extend the classic Dorfman-Steiner model
on optimal advertising expenditures by considering the effects of current
advertising on future demand.45
Another notion of advertising is that of strategic firm behaviour. This
notion is mainly based on the idea that advertising can function as a sig-
44Many economic discussions assume that advertising is given away to consumers
(dT/dA = 0), that advertisements do not directly provide utility (Va = 0), and that
advertising raises the price of advertised goods (dpx/dA has a positive sign) which is why
most of them conclude that advertising is generally excessive. However, Becker and Mur-
phy (1993) argue that “[. . . ]advertising does affect the utility of consumers and is often
sold - sometimes at a negative price” and determine whether advertising is socially optimal
by means of the ’surplus criterion’ given by (2).
45In an interesting extension of the Arrow-Nerlove model to oligopolistic markets, Fer-
shtman (1984) argues that the optimal stock of goodwill can be described as a function
of the current market share. See Appendix C for a short explanation of Fershtman’s
argument.
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nal of strategic commitment, i.e., a promise or warning to rivals that the
advertising firm will stay in the market because it will want to recoup the
sunk investments it made by advertising. In addition, such investments may
deter entry by raising potential entrants’ costs.46
Though solid empirical evidence of the amount and effect of advertis-
ing in services markets is lacking, it is possible to cautiously draw a few
conclusions from the above theories and available empirical evidence on
advertising-intensive industries. Arguments of excessive advertising usually
refer to persuasive advertising. Where advertising has the effect of reducing
informational asymmetries it may be more efficient and thus closer to the
social optimum. Claims of excessive advertising also argue that competitive
advertising may do little more than cancel out. However, empirical results
indicate that this is mostly the case among firms producing consumer goods,
particularly non-durables.47 Studies of the US cigarette industry indicate
that in advertising-intensive markets, advertising does not only rearrange
market shares but may also increase total market demand.48 Whether ad-
vertising in a particular service market is excessive or not thus depends on
the degree of competition in the market, the type of advertising, the ex-
tent of asymmetric information, and the effects on demand for variety and
quality.
4.3 Collusion
Quite a number of studies have analysed collusion in markets where non-
price competition plays an important role. Most of that literature starts
from the basis of some degree of market power exists, stemming from the
product differentiation and informational asymmetries characteristic of non-
price competition. Two seminal papers by Dixit (1979) and Lancaster
46In the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), this type of entry-deterring be-
haviour would be classified as a ‘top dog’ strategy.
47Netter (1982).
48See Roberts and Samuelson (1988).
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(1998), in particular, compare various equilibria obtained by collusion on
price, quality and/or entry, and price alone respectively.
Dixit (1979) focuses on the interaction between collusion over some or all
of the strategic variables entry, quantity and quality and competition in the
others and compares the various equilibria with each other as well as with the
social optimum. Dixit finds that when the objective is to maximise average
profit, the collusive control of entry essentially amounts to full collusion
(i.e. the two cases yield the same welfare results). When the objective is
to maximise total profit, Dixit finds that in the social optimum, as well
as in the equilibrium in case of full collusion, and the equilibrium in case
of collusion over entry and quantity, the choice of quantity (given quality)
occurs at the minimum of the cost per unit of contribution to the industry
sub-utility. Making the additional assumptions of linear costs and increasing
quality increases the price elasticity of demand, Dixit further finds that the
equilibria in the asymmetric cases of collusion over entry and collusion over
both entry and quality are second-best in terms of welfare, and that enforcing
competition in only one dimension may actually reduce welfare.
Lancaster (1998) examines the effect of collusion on non-price efforts in
the market by analysing the result of an increased price (due to regulation
or cartel agreement) on non-price competition. Reasonable assumptions on
the behaviour of other economic parameters49 lead Lancaster to conclude
that the effect of a price constraint above the equilibrium level on the degree
of non-price competition depends on the presence of economies of scale in
the non-price variable.50 Economies of scale are limited in most services
industries, which implies that the term qzz is close to zero in these markets.
49Lancaster (1998) assumes demand is downward-sloping, sales efforts or advertising
activities increase sales. In addition, he assumes non-decreasing marginal cost and some
monopoly markup and that price increases hardly affect the influence of non-price com-
petition on sales (and certainly do not increase it).
50In the presence of economies of scale, an imposed price increase away from the equi-
librium would lead a firm to cut back on its non-price efforts, and a price ceiling set under
the equilibrium price would increase the firm’s sales efforts.
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Consequently, a price increase resulting from collusion would, if anything,
induce greater non-price competitive effort.
This finding seems consistent with some authors’ doubts about the pos-
sibility of successful cartelisation in markets characterised by non-price com-
petition.51 After all, the incentive to cheat on any price agreement by sup-
plying non-price services is considerable since non-price activities are partic-
ularly difficult to detect. Where non-price competition shapes a considerable
part of the market (as is the case in services markets), this incentive is even
larger. Ginsburg (1993) states that: “[. . .] cartelization cannot be profitable
- and is therefore a good deal less likely to occur - in a market where non-
price competition can play a significant role”. Ginsburg refers to the intense
non-price competition and insignificant excess profits in regulated transport
industries and reasons agreement on non-price variables and detection of
cheating would be too difficult and too costly for firms, even in concen-
trated markets. Other empirical evidence also implies that collusion has not
been an important phenomenon in most services markets.52
Ivaldi et al (2003) add that a situation of vertical differentiation is similar
to a situation of asymmetric costs of production. It is argued that the firm
that can offer a better quality at the same costs (or, equivalently, the same
quality at lower costs) would have more to gain from cheating and would
have less to fear from a possible retaliation from the other firms. They
conclude that “when firms are differentiated by levels of quality, collusion
is more difficult, the larger the competitive advantage of the high-quality
firm”.
Successful collusion on non-price activities is also argued to be unlikely,
again because monitoring output and detecting potential cheating is very
difficult.53 Finally, it is sometimes argued that, as with technological com-
51Exceptions are markets that are affected by regulation that inhibits entry, similar to
the effects some professional bodies may have.
52See, for example, Gaynor and Haas-Wilson (1999) for an analysis on competition in
health care markets.
53In addition, Ginsburg (1993) points at the difficulties of agreement on non-price vari-
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petition, firms in services markets must engage in intense non-price rivalry
to secure the survival of the enterprise as reputation and goodwill are a ser-
vice provider’s dearest assets in that they signal the quality of the provided
service (see section 2.2.2).
It can thus be concluded that for service providers, in the absence of
regulatory barriers to entry, actual collusion on either price or quantity is
unlikely to be successful in most services markets due to the high incentive
to cheat (in turn due to the low probability of detection) and the need for
continuous non-price competition. Where collusion is possible, for example
due to the presence of industry associations or other regulatory entry bar-
riers, Dixit’s analysis may well apply (i.e., we might observe collusion on
several variables at the same time and enforcing competition in only one
area may actually reduce welfare).
5 Evaluation of Competition Policy Instruments
Performance evaluation in services markets may be inaccurate because of
the difficulties that arise when defining markets, measuring output, and
determining the intensity of competition. The nature of services and the
prominent role of non-price competition in services markets require more
than the traditional performance measures and market definition instru-
ments and this should be taken into account by competition authorities
when evaluating firm behaviour and/or performance in these markets.
ables from an intra-firm perspective. These difficulties appear to increase with the size
of the firm. Joyce (1989) finds evidence that the decision-maker within the firm is more
likely to collude if he or she has a substantial ownership stake in the firm, which is of
course more likely in a small than in a large enterprise. In addition, as more individuals
within the firm are affected by the decision to collude, agreement on non-price variables
becomes increasingly difficult, profitability per person decreases and the probability of
detection increases.
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5.1 Traditional performance measures
Sosnick (1958) lists a number of traditional market performance norms sug-
gested by various writers: “(1) Operations should be efficient. (2) Promotion
expenses should not be excessive. (3) Profits should be at levels which re-
ward investment and efficiency and induce innovation. (4) Output should be
consistent with a good allocation of resources. (5) Prices should not intensify
the cyclical problem. (6) Quality should conform to consumers’ interests.
[. . .] (10) Entry should be as free as the nature of the industry permits.”.
Most of these criteria can be reduced to the behaviour of the parameters
price, quantity, and profit. Though these parameters may provide some
indication of performance in many markets today, it can be argued that
they do not fully reflect competition in services markets and that additional
parameters should be analysed to obtain a complete picture.
The reasons for this position are multifold. Because of the nature of
services, output in services markets is generally difficult to measure. Apart
from the fact that a rather low number of countries actually reports on
services trade, available data are aggregated at best, full of discontinuities
at worst, and systematic recompilation by international organisations has
simply not yet developed. In addition, most of the available data show values
only and do not distinguish between movements attributable to price change
and movements attributable to changes in quantities or qualities.54 The
resulting lack of useable data poses a problem for analysts, policymakers, and
businesses alike. Although some progress has been achieved by international
organisations and national statistical offices in recent years, the area still is
not highly developed. It is unlikely that this fundamental problem will be
resolved in the future due to the very nature of services and the difficulties
associated with measuring output.
Spence (1977) argues that profits may be an equally poor indicator of
market performance in markets characterised by non-price competition. Ba-
54see Whichard (2001).
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sically, he states that performance may be inadequate even in the absence
of excessive profits, not because prices do not accurately reflect costs, but
because a failure in the area of non-price competition may cause costs to be
too high or too low.55 It should be noted that even in a competitive services
market, price may exceed marginal cost, as in the presence of asymmetric
information, price is often used to signal a certain level of quality (i.e. a
high price ‘ensures’ high quality).
Though ‘quality’ is among the performance norms listed by Sosnick
(1958), it has not received nearly as much attention in antitrust decisions as
the traditional performance measures price, quantity and profit. However,
the prominent role of non-price competition in services implies that these
indicators become less reliable, as quality is an important determinant of
performance. As modern economic literature reveals, the inclusion of qual-
ity in economic analysis is likely to result in outcomes quite different from
outcomes based on traditional performance evaluation alone. Quality and
diversity may increase utility and affect both the position and shape of the
demand curve by increasing total demand and possibly changing demand
elasticities. This would have serious implications for welfare and a great
impact on the outcomes of cost-benefit analyses.
5.2 Concentration ratios
As performance varies with structure, an important set of performance indi-
cators are actually measures of market structure. Concentration ratios and
other measures of market power are widely used in economic research as
well as in antitrust policy. One of the most common concentration ratios is
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of squares of the
market shares of all firms in the industry:
(s1)
2 + (s2)
2 + (s3)
2 + . . .+ (sn)
2, (3)
55See also section 3.2.
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where s1 is the market share of firm 1, s2 is the market share of firm 2,
etc. Another often quoted concentration ratio is the C4, which is the share
of industry sales accounted for by the largest four firms in the market.56
Related to these measures is the price-cost margin given by the Lerner Index:
P −MCi
P
=
si
εQP
, (4)
which is often used as a measure of market power.57 The difference between
price P and firm i’s marginal cost MCi as a fraction of the price measures
that firm’s mark-up, which is equal to that firm’s market share si divided by
the elasticity of demand. In other words, the greater the mark-up a firm is
able to obtain without losing too many customers, and thus the greater that
firm’s market share, the greater its market power. The aggregated Lerner
Index shows the industry average of firms’ price-cost margins using share
weights
P − c¯
P
=
∑
i(si)
2
εQP
, (5)
where c¯ is industry-wide marginal cost and
∑
i(si)
2 is equal to the HHI.
Carlton and Perloff (2000) note that, in addition to measurement diffi-
culties, concentration measures have two serious problems. One is that most
commonly used ratios are not exogenous measures of market structure. Fac-
tors like profitability have an influence on market structure, and most con-
centration measures depend on the profitability of the industry. The result
is that they do not describe market structure in a way that suggests prop-
erties of the market that definitely indicate performance. A second problem
is that many concentration measures are biased because of improper market
definitions. This issue will be discussed extensively in section 4.4.
56The share of sales accounted for by the largest eight firms, the C8, is also used some-
times.
57It should be noted that this measure is more applicable in some industries than others.
For example, in industries with high fixed costs, one may expect price to exceed marginal
cost - this implies recovery of investment rather than market power.
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In addition to the above problems, concentration measures are unlikely to
accurately reflect performance in services markets. Some argue that actual
performance may be much closer to the competitive mark than examination
of concentration ratios alone would suggest (Martin, 1994).58 As pointed
out above, cartels are inherently unstable because firms have an incentive
to cheat on the agreement by engaging in non-price competition. Especially
where non-price competition plays an important role in shaping a market,
as it does in services industries, agreements on price or entry are likely to be
undermined by the incentive of firms to engage in non-price activities. Thus,
although high concentration ratios may alarm antitrust authorities, they do
not accurately reflect the amount of competition in the market, as intense
non-price competition may act as a restraint on market power, i.e., on the
ability to raise price or preclude entry. In fact, the endogeneous sunk cost
model of Sutton (1991) tells us that where competition is based on invest-
ment in sunk outlays like advertising, we may expect to see a concentrated
market structure as the outcome of a vigorous competitive process. Empir-
ical evidence from retailing and banking sectors (see Ellickson (2003) and
Dick (2002), respectively) indicates that this is particularly true for services
markets.
In evaluating market performance in services industries, particularly
with respect to potential collusion, competition authorities should thus be
cautious to base their decisions on concentration ratios. Insofar as compe-
tition authorities can identify markets in which there are opportunities for
firms to engage in non-price competition without the chance of easy detec-
tion by rival firms, “[. . .] enforcement agencies should be sceptical about the
prospects for cartelisation” (Ginsburg, 1993). In addition, in the same way
58Martin (1994) argues that in industries characterised by rapid technological develop-
ment, firms must engage in intense rivalry, resulting in performance being much closer
to the competitive mark than suggested by concentration ratios. His argument can be
equally well applied to markets where reputation, rather than technological development,
is crucial to firms’ survival. See Martin (1994) p132.
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merger control takes into account the facilitating effects of potential com-
petition in the post-merger market (either through new entry or expansion
of existing firms), when evaluating proposed mergers, antitrust authorities
should take into account the beneficial effects of non-price competition on
market performance.59 It is desirable that antitrust authorities recognise
the prominent role of non-price competition in services markets requires a
careful approach to the application of concentration ratios.
5.3 Market definition
One of the most important conditions for proper enforcement of competition
policy is appropriate relevant market definition, as it is “[. . .] the critical
underpinning for the evaluations of substantial lessening of competition, the
calculation of concentration ratios and the evaluation of import competition
and barriers to entry”.60 Competition authorities throughout the world
normally define a market in both its product and geographic dimension.
The European Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market
(1997) provides definitions for these two dimensions, that are very similar
to the notions of relevant markets existing in other countries:
“A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or
services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the
consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, their prices and
their intended use.”
“The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the
undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of prod-
ucts or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently
59However, others argue the reverse might be the case if non-price competition is not
included in market analysis. In a paper on hospital mergers, Conners (2003) argues that
consolidation may affect non-price factors in the same way that price competition is often
affected, i.e., larger players may lose their incentive to attract and maintain customers
(patients) and quality may decrease. It should be added that this depends on the ability
of consumers to detect quality differentials.
60Australian Merger Guidelines (1999).
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homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring ar-
eas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in
those areas”.
In addition, the Australian Merger Guidelines (1999) explicitly distinguish
a functional and a time dimension. The recently amended New Zealand
Merger and Acquisitions Guidelines (2004) also provide a customer dimen-
sion: where a significant group of buyers within a relevant market is likely
to be subject to price discrimination, the Commerce Commission considers
whether it would be appropriate to define additional markets based on par-
ticular uses for a good or service, particular groups of buyers, or buyers in
particular geographic areas that are captive to those products, and in the
face of a price increase unable to switch.
Defining the relevant market may be quite complex in services industries.
For example, there are many different providers of health services, or finan-
cial services. Are (the providers of) acute care services in the same market
as primary care services or physiotherapy?61 The boundaries of a relevant
market are defined by three competitive restraints on firm behaviour: de-
mand substitution, supply substitution, and (to a lesser extent) potential
competition. We argue that these criteria need to be reassessed in the face
of increasing non-price competition.
Supply substitution reflects the ability of suppliers in related markets to
switch production to the relevant products (services) and market them in the
short term without incurring significant additional costs or risks in response
to small and permanent changes in relative prices.62 Potential competition
refers to the possibility of new entry that may increase the relevant market.
61When evaluating the proposed merger between the Westpac Bank and the Bank of
Melbourne, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission identified distinct
product clusters for deposits, home loans, small business banking, credit cards, personal
loans and transaction accounts.
62The European Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the
Purposes of Community Competition Law, 1997.
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Where supply side substitutability and potential competition are thought
to have a disciplinary effect on the competitive behaviour of the firms in-
volved, they are equivalent to the demand substitution effect.63 It can be
argued that the disciplinary effect of supply substitution in services mar-
kets is limited. Though supply substitution may be technically feasible in
some cases, the importance of intangible assets as reputation and goodwill
(and the required investments in these assets), as well as specialist skills,
in services markets may limit supply substitution (and potential entry, for
that matter) having a truly disciplinary effect on the firms considered. The
same is true for the effect of potential entrants. However, the disciplinary
effects stemming from fringe firms already in the market should not be un-
derestimated. To the extent that services markets can be described by the
endogenous sunk cost model of Sutton (1991), we may expect a varying
number of fringe firms in the market. Though these firms may operate in
market niches or provide lower quality services than the dominant firms in
the market,64 they may well limit the extent to which those dominant firms
can set price above marginal cost.
Demand substitution measures the response in demand to a “Small but
Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price”. This so-called SSNIP test
seeks to identify the smallest market within which a hypothetical monopolist
or cartel could impose such a price increase and defines this as the relevant
market. Traditionally, demand substitution is regarded as constituting the
most immediate and effective disciplinary force on the suppliers of a given
63It should be noted that it is generally thought that the competitive restraints arising
from supply side substitutability and potential competition are less immediate than those
of demand substitution and though such constraints are taken into account, primary
attention is focused on demand substitution.
64Dick (2002) finds that in the banking industry, which can be well explained by the
endogeneous sunk cost model of Sutton (1991), the dominant firms provide a higher level
of quality than fringe banks.
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product, “[. . .] in particular in relation to their pricing decisions”.65 How-
ever, given the prominent role of non-price competition in services markets
and the fact that demand in these markets is based on price and non-price
variables, we may expect considerably smaller demand substitution in ser-
vices markets than in markets mainly characterised by price competition.
However, limited demand substitution is regarded (at least partial) proof of
a limited relevant market. By definition, the smaller the market, the larger
is each firm’s market share. But large market shares may be associated
with dominance, with the possible result that competition authorities will
interpret firms’ actions to be anti-competitive.66 In addition, a proposed
merger may be thought to obtain a dominant position after merging and
consequently may be denied or accepted on an inaccurate notion of market
size.
The SSNIP test is difficult to apply in markets characterised by a high
degree of product differentiation as there might not be a obvious chain of
substitutes, which could potentially result in multiple competing market
definitions.67 Hence, the methods used to measure demand substitution
clearly need to be reassessed in the face of growing services markets and
the associated increasing importance of non-price competition. Instead of
the often-used SSNIP test, competition authorities should look at alter-
native measures that recognise that demand is determined by both price
and quality, and acknowledge that sole focus on price-elasticity may gener-
ate inaccurate market definitions and potentially inefficient policy decisions.
Though some do not believe that an alternative sensible methodology to the
SSNIP test exists,68, the New Zealand Merger and Acquisition Guidelines
65The European Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the
Purposes of Community Competition Law, 1997.
66Dominance is not regarded as anti-competitive as such, however when firms are con-
sidered to be dominant, their actions are thought to have the ability to restraint trade or
competition and may therefore be considered anti-competitive.
67See, for example, Rubinsfeld (2000).
68See NERA (2001), p19.
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(2004) recognise that in differentiated product markets, market boundaries
are often difficult to delineate precisely, as the different products can vary
in the degree to which they are substitutable. As services are differentiated
by nature, the following applies especially to services markets: “In these
markets, the Commission considers the varying degree of competitive con-
straint on the products of the combined entity. Less close substitutes impose
a lesser competitive constraint than closer substitutes”.69 Where there is
no obvious break in the chain of substitutes, antitrust authorities should
focus upon competition analyses and the impact of a potential acquisition
on localised prices, rather than precise market definition.
5.4 Other forms of regulation
There are a number of ways in which regulators can influence competition in
services markets in addition to the general competition framework in place.
In a recent Communication Report, the European Commission (2004) eval-
uates various methods that are used to regulate markets for professional
services specifically. Where necessary (for example to guarantee quality, im-
prove information provision, and/or guarantee sufficient supply), regulators
can regulate prices, advertising, entry, and business structure, though the
European Commission remarks that in all cases of regulation a proportion-
ality test should be applied.70 This section will shortly discuss each of these
policy instruments.71 It should be noted that while the report of the Euro-
pean Commission concerns professional services only, some of the discussed
regulatory measures could equally well be applied in other services markets.
Though some professional associations argue fixed prices will ensure low
69The New Zealand Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines (2004), p17. The ‘Commission’
is the New Zealand Commerce Commission.
70In other words, regulators need to ensure that the intervention is proportional to the
problem at hand and check the availability of other, less restricting options that may lead
to the same result.
71For an extensive analysis on regulation of professional services see European Commis-
sion (2004).
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prices, economic theory suggests that price regulation is unlikely to ensure
prices that are lower than at competitive levels. It is also argued that maxi-
mum prices might protect consumers from excessive charges in markets with
high entry barriers and a lack of effective competition. However, empirical
evidence does not indicate that this is actually the case.72 An alternative
to fixed prices is said to be ‘recommended’ prices, though it can effectively
be argued that their main benefit - information provision - can also be ob-
tained with alternative methods of providing price information that do not
potentially facilitate the co-ordination of prices between service providers.
Particularly, professional services are often subject to some form of ad-
vertising regulation in addition to the general legislation that prevents un-
truthful or deceptive advertising. Sometimes advertising is prohibited com-
pletely, in other cases specific types of advertising content are proscribed.
The ongoing debate on advertising regulation concentrates around two main
arguments. On the one hand, advertising restrictions may contribute to
lessen information asymmetries present in services markets, to the extent
that it can guarantee truthful and non-manipulative information provision.
Opponents of advertising restriction argue that if anything, it may ham-
per information provision and reduce competition by increasing the costs of
gaining information. Empirical evidence on advertising restrictions in legal
services seems to favour the latter argument, though no general comments
can be made on the subject until more research has been conducted in this
area.73
The main rationale for qualitative restrictions on entry is to ensure the
quality of the services provided. Such restrictions can take the form of
minimum periods of education, professional examinations, and experience,
and have traditionally been maintained by professional associations such
as the American Medical Association. Experience has shown, however, that
excessive licensing restrictions have in some cases led to higher prices without
72Idem.
73Stephen and Love (2000).
40
ensuring higher quality, and, conversely, that the loosening of restrictions in
some professions has led to lower prices without any apparent detriment to
quality. Fortunately, regulators recognise that most entry restrictions would
not pass the proportionality test nowadays and that alternative mechanisms
to guarantee quality should be used instead.74
A final regulatory instrument to influence competition in services mar-
kets is business structure regulations, which may, for example, restrict busi-
ness ownership and collaboration with other service providers. Any such
restrictions are in place to ensure service providers’ personal responsibility
and liability towards customers and to avoid conflicts of interest. They may
have negative consequences for dynamic efficiency, however, to the extent
that they may inhibit providers from developing new services or cost-efficient
business models. Also here, regulators should consider whether the restric-
tions are justified in terms of the fulfillment of their objective.
6 Conclusion
Though ‘services’ is a very broad concept and any generalisations should
be made with caution, it is widely acknowledged that services differ from
goods in many respects. In addition, we have come to understand that the
production and consumption of services have distinctive elements. In the
previous discussion, we have attempted to answer the question whether this
distinctive working of services markets also implies a distinctive competi-
tive process and, if so, if this requires a separate set of competition policy
measures. In answering this question, we have analysed the main elements
of market structure, conduct and performance that prevail in most services
markets and the interface between these elements.
We have seen that most services markets can be described as either
monopolistic competitive or oligopolistic. Key structural aspects that are
strongly related to the nature of services are a high degree of product differ-
74European Commission (2004), p16.
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entiation, sunk costs, and asymmetric information. Though such a market
structure tends to give service providers a certain degree of market power,
most services markets appear to be characterised by intense non-price com-
petition.
One feature of this form of competition is that service providers engage
in both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, according to con-
sumers’ preferences. Another is the possibility of quality discrimination,
which, according to empirical evidence, is particularly apparent in markets
for medical and other experts’ services. Finally, in oligopolistic services mar-
kets, non-price competition is likely to contain elements of interdependence,
resulting in a positive conjectural variation that shows advertising outlays
are strategic complements.
Market performance is invariably linked with market structure and con-
duct. The most important performance aspects in services markets are
product diversity, advertising, and collusion. We have seen that in the pres-
ence of constant economies of scale, the optimal number of service varieties
is essentially unbound. And although advertising is thought by some to be
excessive, it can contribute to greater transparency in most services markets,
which are inherently characterised by asymmetric information. As advertis-
ing outlays appear to be strategic complements in services markets, intense
non-price competition through (sunk) investments in reputation and good-
will may result in concentrated market structures. This theory is known as
the endogeneous sunk cost model or natural oligopoly theory as provided by
Sutton (1991).
Possibilities for collusion seem limited in most services markets, as the
focus on non-price competition complicates monitoring output and detecting
cheating. Industry organisations, which we often find in medical professions,
may affect entry conditions and quality standards. Where this is the case,
the economic literature points out that enforcing competition in only one of
these areas may result in second-best outcomes, particularly where regula-
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tory intervention would pose a barrier to entry.
We found that the traditional competition policy tools inaccurately re-
flect competition and performance in services markets. Measurement prob-
lems and lack of data cause price, output, and profit to be less reliable
measures. More importantly, quality, the main variable in non-price compe-
tition, receives insufficient attention in most competition analyses, leaving
the authorities with an inaccurate image of competition in the market. In
addition, whereas concentration ratios usually alarm competition authori-
ties and point at inefficient market performance, high concentration rates
may actually be an outcome of vigorous non-price competition in services
markets. Finally, the main instrument of market definition, the SSNIP test,
appears to be unsuited to evaluate competition in differentiated markets.
The test relies on measurement of output and price-responsiveness, both of
which are difficult to measure and only partially indicative of performance in
services markets. Instead competition authorities are best to focus on com-
petition analyses that include barriers to entry and search for alternatives
that account for the disciplining power of non-price competition. Any alter-
natives and possibly service-specific regulations should of course be subject
to a proportionality test to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.
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Appendix A
The basic Endogeneous Sunk Cost (ESC) model
As long as sunk costs are exogenous (for example setup costs), concentra-
tion in both homogenous and heterogenous product markets declines indefi-
nitely as market size increases and rises with what Sutton calls the “tough-
ness of price competition”75. In these types of industry, bigger markets
allow sunk costs to be spread over larger sales (Ellickson, 2003). However,
when sunk outlays such as advertising or R&D activities enhance consumers’
willingness-to-pay, thereby increasing the total size of the market, competi-
tion will lead to escalating investment in sunk costs by the dominant firms
in the market. It is these endogenous sunk costs that prevent an industry to
converge to a fragmented structure, however large the market may be. This
market structure is referred to as a “natural oligopoly”.
Building on the theory of vertical product differentiation and assuming
that increases in fixed outlays raise consumers’ willingness-to-pay, Sutton
defines a three-stage game in which firms respectively decide on entry (at
cost σ), choose a value of vertical attribute u (quality) at additional cost
A(u), and compete in a Cournot game in which all firms but one offer the
same level of perceived quality u¯, while one deviant firm offers some level u.
The firm’s total fixed outlays are a combination of the setup cost σ and the
advertising outlay A(u), introducing a as the cost per message:
F (u) = σ +A(u) (6)
where A(U) is of the form
A(u) =
a
γ
(uγ − 1), y > 1. (7)
75Sutton uses the term “toughness of price competition” to refer to the function linking
concentration to prices or unit margins. This function will be affected by such features
of the market as the physical nature of the product (homogeneous versus differentiated
products) and the climate of competition policy.
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Higher values of γ correspond to more rapidly diminishing returns to in-
creases in outlays. The elasticity of the function F (u) (i.e., the extent to
which we have increasing, constant, or decreasing costs in u) can then be
written as
u
F
dF
du
= γ
[
1−
σ − a
γ
F
]
. (8)
As u → ∞, F (u) → ∞ and this elasticity tends to γ, but for any finite u
(and thus F (u)), the elasticity lies above or below γ as σ < a
γ
or σ > a
γ
.
When σ = a
γ
, the elasticity is constant for all u.
The relationship between market size S and the equilibrium number of
firms N is specified by the equation
N +
1
N
+ 2 =
γ
2
[
1−
σ − a
γ
S
N2
]
. (9)
The right-hand side of this equation takes the value γ
2
as S → ∞. Sutton
denotes the unique N that solves for this as N˜(γ
2
). Assuming zero profits,
i.e., F = S/N2, (9) reduces to
N +
1
N
+ 2 =
γ
2
[
1−
σ − a
γ
F
]
, (10)
which describes a locus in (N,F ) space that is upward sloping, vertical, or
downward sloping according as σ is greater than, equal to, or less than aγ.
The market size / market structure relationship is different in each of these
cases, which is illustrated in Figure (2):
• σ = aγ
For a sufficiently small market size S, where the marginal cost of ad-
vertising outweigh the marginal benefits, i.e., where
dΠ
du
∣∣∣
u=u¯=1
≤
dF
du
∣∣∣
u=1
, (11)
equilibrium corresponds to that of the symmetric Cournot model where
all firms offer a common level of perceived quality u¯ = 1 and no ad-
ditional advertising outlays are incurred. As S increases, however, a
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number of firms N is reached at which advertising begins - this so-
called ”switch value” is determined by replacing the inequality in (11)
by an equality, writing this condition in explicit form, multiplying
across by u¯ and solving the resulting expression
2S
(N − 1)2
N3
= γ
[
F − (σ −
a
γ
]
(12)
for N. In this case, the switch value coincides with N∞ = N˜(
γ
2
). Fur-
ther increases in market size involve only increasing levels of advertis-
ing, with no further change in market structure.
• σ < aγ
As S increases, N first increases until the switch value (where the
market switches from non-advertising to advertising) is reached. Be-
yond this level, N falls as S increases and as S → ∞, N converges
asymptotically to the value N∞ = N˜(
γ
2
).
• σ > aγ
A similar analysis indicates that the number of firms N increases (i.e.,
concentration decreases) in the case of σ > aγ, as market size S in-
creases, regardless of advertising levels.
Figure (2) shows the relationship between market size and market structure
for these different values of σ. The
∑∑
locus connects the switching values
that indicate where the market switches from non-advertising to advertising.
Extensions and generalisations of the basic model
Two extensions of the basic model involve a dual market structure due to
differences in consumer tastes, and first-mover advantages in a sequential
game. In the first case, it is assumed that two groups of consumers ex-
ist, one being more or less sensitive to advertising (the retail segment) and
one choosing suppliers largely on the basis of price alone (the non-retail
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Figure 2: Concentration and market size
Source: Sutton (1991).
Note: σ¯ = σ1 > σ2 =
a
γ
> σ3 > σ4 > σ5 = σ.
segment). Here, there are two critical values of market size S. First, as S in-
creases, some critical value S1 is reached where one firm begins to advertise.
Sutton states that in this regime, consumers are indifferent between adver-
tised and non-advertised goods as p = up¯. However, as S increases further,
a second critical value S2 is reached beyond which the (p, u) combination
offered by the advertising firm(s) is strictly preferred by retail consumers
(p < up¯). From this point on, the two sub-markets are essentially indepen-
dent. In the retail segment, further increases in (sub-)market size will only
increase levels of advertising, while the number of firms will stay constant.
The retail market will develop as described in the basic model and hence,
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will remain concentrated no matter how large the market becomes. The
non-retail segment, on the other hand, will evolve according to the predic-
tions of the traditional exogenous sunk cost model, in which the number
of firms will increase with market size and consequently, concentration will
converge to zero.
When allowing one or more firms to enjoy first-mover advantages, a
strategic asymmetry is introduced which is best captured by a game of
sequential entry. In an illustrative example, Sutton (1991) shows that the
first mover can successfully preempt entry for γ close to 1 by only slightly
increasing its advertising outlays above those that would be undertaken in a
symmetric (duopoly) equilibrium76. For larger values of γ, as market size S
increases, a critical market size is reached beyond which a second firm enters.
The leader’s advertising levels (and profitability) will fall but will still be
higher than the entrant’s. Further increases in S lead to growth in both
firms’ advertising levels, but, Sutton remarks, the size disparity between the
two remains.
Tested for different values of the parameters σ, a, and γ, the relationship
between market size and market structure as described by (9) in the basic
model and used in the extensions above has two important features, that can
easily be inferred from Figure (2). First, the so-called ’convergence prop-
erty’ does not hold, i.e. increases in market size do not lead to an indefinite
fall in the level of concentration. Secondly, the market size/market struc-
ture relationship is not necessarily monotonic. Empirical evidence suggests
that industries (or sub-markets) that are relatively insensitive to advertis-
ing are well explained by the exogenous cost model (like the salt and sugar
industry), while more advertising-intensive industries like the frozen food
and the clothing industry appear to conform well to the predictions of the
endogenous sunk cost theory.77
76Where γ is close to 1, duopoly profits are approximately zero.
77Sutton (1991).
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Appendix B
The foundation of modern economic literature on non-price competition is
laid down in Chamberlin’s (1948) model of monopolistic competition, in
which quality variation is treated as a monopolistic element that distin-
guishes producers from one another within what is essentially one market.
Building on this theory is the model of Spence (1977). In this model, Spence
compares the supply of non-price services in various optima and equilibria,
allowing for free entry. Basically, he states that performance may be inad-
equate even in the absence of excessive profits, not because prices do not
accurately reflect costs, but because a failure in the area of non-price com-
petition may cause costs to be too high or too low. Spence assumes demand
depends upon prices or quantities (X ) and upon non-price expenditures78
(A) according to the specification:
B (X,A) = G
[
n∑
i=1
φi(xi, ai)
]
(13)
where G is a concave function of all products and non-price activities pro-
duced in the industry. Assuming symmetry, constant elasticity, denoting
the costs per firm as c(x,a) and the number of firms as n, total surplus is
T = G(s)− nc(x, a).
As
s = nφ(x, a),
total surplus can be written as
T = G(s)− s
c(x, a)
φ(x, a)
.
From this it follows that the surplus is maximised when c/φ is minimised
with respect to x and a, i.e. when
G′(s) = min
x,a
(
c
φ
)
. (14)
78I.e., expenditures that are made for non-price competition purposes.
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However, firm profits equal revenues (price pi times quantity xi) minus costs.
As the inverse demand for firm i is given by
pi(X,A) = G
′(s)
δφi
δxi
(xi, ai),
the profits of the representative firm are thus
pi = G′(s)xφx(x, a)− c(x, a)
and equilibrium occurs when
G′(s) = min
x,a
(
c
xφx
)
. (15)
A crucial assumption in Spence’s model is free entry. The threat of entry
forces firms to adopt strategies that minimise c
xφx
. Because φ is concave in
x (i.e., demands are downward sloping), xφx < φ. This implies that the
minimum of c
φ
is less than the minimum of c
xφx
and thus, that profits are
negative at the optimum. In essence, in the constant elasticity case, markets
tend to oversupply non-price services. Relaxing the assumption of constant
elasticity, Spence shows that market performance is determined by whether
the ratio of revenues to incremental surplus declines or increases in x and a,
i.e.:
δ
δa
(
xφx
φ
)
< / > 0 and
δ
δx
(
xφx
φ
)
< / > 0. (16)
According to Spence, a market tends to oversupply non-price services that
increase this ratio, and to undersupply those that do not.
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Appendix C
In an interesting extension of the Arrow-Nerlove model to oligopolistic mar-
kets, Fershtman (1984) finds that the optimal stock of goodwill Gˆi can be
described as a function of the current market share Si(t):
Gˆi(Si) = (p−mi)φ(p)
[
αSi(1− Si)
r + δ
]
]
(17)
where
(p−mi)φ(p)
is the markup (price minus marginal cost) on the quantity supplied and
αSi(1− Si)
r + δ
is a discounted measure of the optimal stock of goodwill given market share
Si and the goodwill-elasticity of demand, α. Now we can derive the optimal
advertising policy for the ith firm at time t, since the market share Si(t) is
given: 

ai(t) = 0 if Gi(t) > GˆiSi(t)
ai(t) = δGˆiSi(t) if Gi(t) = GˆiSi(t)
ai(t) =∞ if Gi(t) < GˆiSi(t).
(18)
In other words, where actual goodwill exceeds the optimal amount of good-
will (as a function of market share Si(t)), it is best not to advertise. In the
opposite case, firms’s optimal advertising policy is to advertise ‘infinitely’
until actual goodwill equals optimal goodwill. Where this is already the
case, firms are best of maintaining their current levels of advertising.
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